Thirty months on Amazon. Not one of them lost money.

Where they started

A company with customers, and no presence where people were searching

Hubbard Peanut Company is family-owned and has been making the same product for decades. They had a direct website business that worked, a real customer base, and a name people in their category already knew. What they didn't have was Amazon.

That's a specific kind of risk for a food brand. The demand exists whether or not you're there to meet it, and a gift-driven catalog concentrates most of its year into eight weeks around the holidays. Launching into that without the listings, inventory, and pricing ready doesn't just cost a quarter — it costs the season the business is built on.

What we did

Built it to be profitable from the first month, not eventually

• Launched February 2024, deliberately outside the holiday window, so the first season on the channel would be run rather than survived.
• Listings and catalog built for a gift buyer, not a pantry buyer — which is a different search, a different photo set, and a different price architecture.
• Advertising kept proportional from the start. Ad cost has run in the low-to-mid single digits as a share of sales for most of the engagement, never as a growth lever pulled in isolation.
• Subscribe & Save built deliberately, from 139 active subscriptions in the first months to 385 — recurring revenue that doesn't need to be re-bought every month.

The decision that mattered most was the launch date. Opening in February gave us three quarters to learn how the catalog behaved before the season that carries the business.

What changed

$1.46M in thirty months, and the margin didn't move

Measured February through July each year, so the season is held constant: sales went from $215,569 to $280,001 to $305,734. Profit after Amazon costs and cost of goods went from $40,394 to $53,817 to $55,559. Margin across those three windows was 18.7%, 19.2%, and 18.2% — effectively flat while the channel grew 42%.

Flat margin through growth is the whole point. It means the additional revenue was earned rather than purchased, and it's the difference between a channel that adds profit and one that just adds volume.

What didn't improve: [[ TROY — decide what goes here. Every other case study on this site names something. Options: the holiday-season margin item (needs a client conversation first), or a smaller true one — e.g. that ad efficiency has drifted up as the account has scaled. Leaving this section out entirely weakens the page. ]]

Why it matters if you're reading this

A profitable channel is a choice you make at the start

Most Amazon launches are run as an experiment: open the account, spend into it, decide later whether it works. That's how a channel ends up two years old and still not making money.

Hub's was built the other way, and the constraint was set before anything went live — this has to be profitable now, not at scale. It's a slower first year. It's also the reason thirty months later there's no month in the record anyone has to explain.